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Can Associations
Have Priority over
Fannie or Freddie?
By R. Wilson Freyermuth and Dale A. Whitman

I

Max Licht

n the typical common interest development, an owners’ association has
a lien on each unit or lot within the
development to secure the payment of
delinquent assessments. In states that
have enacted section 3-116 of the Uniform Condominium Act (UCA) or its
successor, the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA), this lien is
entitled to priority over an otherwiseirst mortgage lien, for six months of
unpaid assessments based on the association’s annual budget. (States vary in
their adoption of the uniform statutes
and a few have changed the six-month
period; for example, the applicable
period in Nevada is nine months.) Statutes in approximately 20 states give this
limited priority to an association’s lien.
Several recent state court cases interpreting these statutes have held that
the association’s lien has not only a
payment priority (that is, not merely a
right to irst payment following a foreclosure by the irst mortgage lender)
but a “true lien priority” over an otherwise-irst lien mortgage—such that
the foreclosure of the association’s lien
R. Wilson Freyermuth is the John D. Lawson
Professor and Curators’ Teaching Professor
at the University of Missouri–Columbia
School of Law and the group chair of the
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and dean emeritus at the University of
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places the otherwise-irst mortgage
The Six-Month “Limited Priority Lien”
lien at risk of being extinguished. If the
for Association Fees Under the Uniform
association forecloses its lien, and the
Common Interest Ownership Act (June 1,
otherwise-irst mortgage lender does
2013), available at www.uniformlaws.
not step forward and redeem its interorg/shared/docs/jeburpa/2013jun1_
est by paying off the priority portion of
JEBURPA_UCIOA%20Lien%20
the association’s lien before the sale, the Priority%20Report.pdf.
association’s sale of the unit or lot will
This careful balance is in jeopardy,
extinguish the irst mortgage lien. See,
however, as the result of challenges
e.g., SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S.
from the Federal Housing Finance
Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014);
Authority (FHFA), claiming that assoChase Plaza Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. J.P. Morciations cannot foreclose on assessment
gan Chase Bank, N.A., 98 A.3d 166 (D.C.
liens without the FHFA’s consent if the
Ct. App. 2014); Summerhill Village Home- property is subject to mortgages held
owners Ass’n v. Roughley, 270 P.3d 639
by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. After
(Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
explaining the basis for the FHFA’s
An association’s six-month lien prinovel defense, this article gives several
ority is sometimes termed a “superlien,” reasons why courts should reject the
but there is nothing particularly “super” defense.
about it; the statute simply provides
12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3):
that an association has a lien with priFHFA’s
Belated Response to
ority over the irst mortgage, much
Association
Lien Foreclosures
like the lien of property taxes in nearly
all states. An association’s total lien is
In SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S.
effectively split into two components:
Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014),
a lien before the irst mortgage for six
the Nevada Supreme Court ruled
months of assessments and a lien junior that an association’s foreclosure of its
to the irst mortgage for any delinquent
limited priority assessment lien extinassessment amount over six months’
guished the otherwise-irst mortgage
worth. In this way, section 3-116 was
lien when the mortgagee failed to
intended to strike “an equitable balance redeem its position by satisfying the
between the need to enforce collection
priority portion of the association’s
of unpaid assessments and the obvilien before the association’s foreous necessity for protecting the priority
closure sale. Following this result,
of the security interests of lenders.”
Fannie Mae and its conservator, the
UCIOA § 3-116, cmt. 1; Joint Editorial
FHFA, have now sued in the U.S. DisBoard for Uniform Real Property Acts,
trict Court for the District of Nevada
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Fannie Mae and FHFA
argued in Fannie Mae
v. SFR Investments
that because the
association foreclosed its
assessment lien without
the prior consent of
FHFA, the association’s
foreclosure sale was
invalid under
federal law.
seeking to set aside the association
lien foreclosure sale. Federal Nati’l
Mortg. Ass’n v. SFR Investments Pool
1, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-02046-JAD-PAL
(hereafter Fannie Mae v. SFR Investments). In this action, Fannie Mae and
FHFA have raised a novel defense
based on certain statutory language
enacted as part of the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008
(HERA). HERA created the FHFA and
transferred to it the supervisory powers over the government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac previously held by the
Ofice of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO) and the Federal Housing Finance Board (Finance
Board). On September 6, 2008, shortly
after the enactment of HERA, FHFA
placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
into federal conservatorship under
the new authority given by HERA.
HERA contains a provision stating
that when FHFA acts as conservator, “[n]o property of the Agency shall
be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, or sale without the
consent of the Agency, nor shall any
involuntary lien attach to the property of the Agency.” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)
(3). Based on this language, Fannie Mae
and FHFA argued in Fannie Mae v. SFR
Investments that because the association
foreclosed its assessment lien without
the prior consent of FHFA, the association’s foreclosure sale was invalid
under federal law.

28
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By its terms, nothing in 12 U.S.C.
§ 4617(j)(3) negates the association’s
lien or reduces the extent to which it
is entitled to priority under state law.
Instead, according to Fannie and FHFA,
the statute purportedly prevents the
association from foreclosing its lien
without FHFA’s consent while the
GSEs are in conservatorship. Presumably, if Fannie or Freddie foreclosed its
irst mortgage, acquired title to the unit,
and subsequently sold it, the superpriority portion of the association’s lien
would survive all of these transactions
and remain enforceable against the
unit’s purchaser. If this is correct, then
obviously any purchaser aware of the
association’s priority lien would reduce
the amount they would be willing to
pay for the property by the amount
of the priority lien, and eventually the
association would recover that amount.
But if the association is in signiicant
inancial dificulty—as is often the case
with associations facing signiicant
numbers of assessment delinquencies—
it may be unable, as a practical matter,
to wait out these events.
As yet, no reported cases construe
12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3). Its language was
borrowed directly from the statute governing the rights of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in its
capacity as receiver of insolvent banks,
enacted in 1989 as part of FIRREA (the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989):
No property of the Corporation
shall be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure
or sale without the consent of the
corporation, nor shall any involuntary lien attach to the property
of the corporation.
12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2). Courts have
routinely upheld this FDIC statute. In
Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d
215 (5th Cir. 1994), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded
mortgages acquired by the FDIC as
receiver were its “property” and were
thus subject to the bar on foreclosure of
any prior lien without the FDIC’s consent. The prior lien at issue in Matagorda
County v. Russell Law (and in virtually
all other reported cases) was a local

government’s property tax lien.
Because the language in 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1825(b)(2) and 4617(j)(3) is essentially
identical, Fannie Mae and the FHFA
have claimed in Fannie Mae v. SFR
Investments that an association likewise
cannot foreclose its priority assessment
lien on units covered by mortgages held
by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac without
the consent of the FHFA. In the authors’
view, however, numerous important
contextual differences merit judicial
rejection of the FHFA’s effort to use 12
U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) as a legal ground to
invalidate association lien foreclosure
sales in Nevada and other states that
have adopted the UCIOA limited priority association lien.
First, the FDIC statute applies to
bank receiverships, and there is a substantial difference between the FDIC’s
receivership of a failed bank and
FHFA’s conservatorship of the GSEs.
An FDIC receivership is relatively shortlived; the FDIC will either sell the assets
of the failed bank or get another bank
to take them over, and this will ordinarily occur within a matter of weeks or
months. In this context, one can argue
that 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) appropriately prohibits foreclosures of FDIC
property without the FDIC’s consent
during the pendency of the receivership.
Effectively, the statute functions as a
temporary stay, enabling the FDIC to do
its job as receiver quickly and without
the distraction of having to respond to
creditor enforcement of competing liens.
By contrast, the FHFA’s conservatorship
of the GSEs is now nearing seven years
and shows no signs of being brought
to a close soon. If 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3)
is given the same broad effect, an association could be stayed for years from
foreclosing its assessment lien on a
unit encumbered by a Fannie or Freddie mortgage, unless FHFA granted its
consent to the association’s foreclosure.
The burden on an association unable to
foreclose its assessment lien would be
commensurately much greater in this
context than in an FDIC receivership.
The effect of HERA’s statutory
language is likely to be much more
onerous on a homeowners’ association in a common interest community
than the effect of the similar language
governing FDIC’s receiverships on
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local governments. A local government’s property taxes apply to a wide
variety of nonresidential real estate
and to housing, and hence the delay in
the local government’s ability to foreclose its tax lien on a few residential
properties on which FDIC holds mortgages will probably have only a minor
economic effect on the local government’s collection of tax revenues. Even
if HERA’s language prevents tax lien
foreclosure of all properties on which
the GSEs have mortgages, the local
government will still have many other
properties available for foreclosure. By
contrast, the delay in an owners’ association’s ability to foreclose on properties
with mortgages held by the GSEs will
often mean the great majority of all of
its liens are temporarily (though who
knows for how long) unenforceable. For
an association with many delinquent
owners—hardly an unusual situation
today—the economic results could be
catastrophic.
Second, the longer delay associated with the FHFA’s conservatorship
is compounded by HERA’s providing no procedure or standards by
which the holder of a prior lien can
obtain authority to foreclose its lien
over FHFA’s objection. In the context of bankruptcy, the harshness of
the automatic stay against creditor
enforcement actions is tempered by
(1) the Bankruptcy Code’s standards
for a secured creditor to obtain relief
from the stay and (2) the creditor’s
ability to obtain appellate review of
a decision by the bankruptcy court
denying relief from the stay. Not only
does HERA purport to require FHFA’s
consent before a foreclosure can extinguish its interest, but also HERA
provides no standards by which
FHFA’s decision to withhold its consent can be evaluated.
FHFA has claimed that actions taken
in its role as conservator of the GSEs
are not subject to any judicial review.
FHFA’s position is relected in recent
litigation over the legality of FHFA’s
actions on Property Assessed Clean
Energy (or PACE) loans. When authorized, PACE loans would permit a
secured lender inancing certain energyeficiency-related renovations to obtain
priority over a prior-recorded mortgage

lien. Based on its concern that an expansion in PACE lending could cause the
subordination of mortgage liens held by
the GSEs (and a threat to the solvency
of the GSEs), FHFA issued a directive to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to
protect themselves against these risks.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did so by
announcing they would no longer purchase mortgages on property subject to
PACE loans. In response, the town of
Babylon, New York, iled an action in
federal court challenging the authority
and constitutionality of FHFA’s directive regarding PACE loans. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rejected this challenge, noting that
as a conservator, FHFA was
expressly empowered to take
“such action as may be—(i) necessary to put [Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac] in a sound and
solvent condition; and (ii) appropriate to . . . preserve . . . [their]
assets and property.” 12 U.S.C.
§ 4617(b)(2)(D). Directing protective measures against perceived
risks is squarely within FHFA’s
powers as a conservator.

person of property without due process
of law. A deprivation occurs when a
governmental actor signiicantly alters
or eliminates property rights recognized by state law.
Although federal courts have not yet
addressed a due process challenge to 12
U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3), they have addressed
a comparable due process challenge to
FDIC’s invocation of 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)
(2) as a bar to actions by municipaliTown of Babylon v. Federal Housing
ties to foreclose real property tax liens
Finance Agency, 699 F.3d 221 (2d Cir.
during FDIC receiverships. A represen2012). Likewise, other circuits have held tative case is Matagorda County v. Russell
actions taken by the FHFA within the
Law, 19 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1994). In Russcope of its powers as conservator are
sell Law, Matagorda County and several
not subject to judicial review. See, e.g.,
other municipal taxing authorities (the
County of Sonoma v. FHFA, 710 F.3d 987, “Taxing Units”) sought to enforce their
992 (9th Cir. 2013).
liens for unpaid real estate taxes on a
In Fannie Mae v. SFR Investments,
parcel owned by Russell Law and covFHFA is taking the position that an
ered by a deed of trust held by Bay City
owners’ association, despite its state law Bank & Trust Co. After Bay City failed
priority under UCIOA, cannot foreclose and was placed into FDIC receiverits assessment lien on a unit or lot covship, the Taxing Units joined the FDIC
ered by a Fannie or Freddie mortgage
as a party to the tax lien foreclosure prowithout FHFA’s consent—and FHFA
ceeding. The U.S. District Court for the
can withhold its consent to such a foreSouthern District of Texas held the Taxclosure in its sole and unreviewable
ing Units could not foreclose their liens
discretion, for the indeinite duration
absent the FDIC’s consent, which the
of the FHFA’s conservatorship. For the
FDIC would not give unless the forereasons explained below, the authors
closure was subject to the FDIC’s lien.
believe the courts should reject this
The Taxing Units argued that by proargument.
hibiting them from foreclosing without
awarding them any recovery against
12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) as a
the FDIC for the value secured by the
Deprivation of Due Process
tax liens, the FDIC had effectively taken
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the
the property of the Taxing Units withfederal government from depriving a
out just compensation.
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The court in Russell Law ultimately
rejected this argument, but its statements in doing so bear close review:
The indeterminate postponement
of the Taxing Units’ ability to collect on their tax lien, while not a
“physical invasion” or a “permanent appropriation” of their assets,
is certainly a severe impairment
of those assets. The Taxing Units
make a persuasive argument
that their ongoing viability—the
ability to provide necessary community services, schools, ire and
police protection, etc.—[is] greatly
compromised by their inability to
collect delinquent taxes. This argument does not fall on deaf ears.
. . . [T]his Court is not convinced
that the [Taxing Units] have
been deprived of a suficient
property interest to create a compensable taking. Congress was
presented with the phenomenal
task of addressing an impending catastrophe in the failure
of inancial institutions and in
response enacted FIRREA. Certain provisions therein are the
classic example of a “public program that adjusts the beneits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” Penn
Cent., supra, 438 U.S. at 124. As
the Court has stated, “Legislation
designed to promote the general
welfare commonly burdens some
more than others.” Id. at 133. This
Court has found that delay in the
exercise of a valuable property
right alone is not suficient to create a compensable taking. That
inding is tempered, indeed limited, by the acknowledgment that
delay to this point is not suficient
to constitute a compensable taking. Unmitigated delay, coupled
with diminishment of distinct
investment-backed expectations,
may, at some point, infringe on the
entire “bundle” of rights enjoyed
by the [Taxing Units] to the point
that a compensable taking occurs.
Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d
at 224–25 (emphasis in original).

30
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In the wake of the
housing crisis prompted
by the Great Recession,
many owners’
associations would
not recover anything
in an association lien
foreclosure if its lien
foreclosure remained
subject to the lien of the
GSE mortgage.
The Fifth Circuit’s admonition
against unmitigated delay in Matagorda
County is squarely appropriate to the
FHFA’s position on 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)
(3). The FHFA’s conservatorship of the
GSEs is now approaching seven years
in duration, with no end in sight—
which unquestionably constitutes
“unmitigated delay.” Further, in the
wake of the housing crisis prompted
by the Great Recession, many owners’
associations would not recover anything in an association lien foreclosure
if a lien foreclosure remained subject to
the lien of the GSE mortgage (the balance of which often exceeds the value of
the home). As a result, the association’s
loss of the ability to foreclose its priority position threatens the association’s
inances and its ability to preserve and
maintain common elements, diminishing the investment-backed expectations
of the association’s owner members. If
the FHFA can refuse to consent to the
foreclosure of an association’s limited
priority lien, with no possibility of judicial review, for an indeinite period,
then the FHFA’s invocation of 12 U.S.C.
§ 4617(j)(3) deprives the association of
its limited priority lien without due process of law.
FHFA’s Behavior as “Consent”
to Association Foreclosures
FHFA now argues that 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)
(3) prohibits an association from foreclosing its limited priority lien to extinguish
a conlicting GSE mortgage lien without
FHFA’s prior consent. But FHFA’s consistent conduct as conservator for the GSEs

has manifested FHFA’s effective consent
to state law lien priority and enforcement
rules validating association lien foreclosure sales like the ones being attacked in
Fannie Mae v. SFR Investments.
FHFA functions as conservator for
the GSEs in their roles (among others)
as purchasers and securitizers of single-family residential mortgage loans,
the terms of which are explicitly governed by state law. In authorizing the
GSEs to purchase and securitize such
loans, FHFA should be understood to
have impliedly consented to the state
law priority and lien enforcement rules
applicable to those mortgages under
state law.
FHFA’s implied consent to an association’s limited priority lien under UCA
and UCIOA, and to an association’s
foreclosure of such a lien, is manifested
in the servicing guidelines published
by the GSEs. The 2015 Fannie Mae Servicing Guide directs Fannie’s servicers
to “take all reasonable actions to prevent new liens that would be superior
to Fannie Mae’s mortgage lien from
being attached against property.” Servicing Guide: Fannie Mae Single Family (Jan.
14, 2015), at 391. This language explicitly acknowledges the risk that a Fannie
mortgage can occupy a subordinate
position under state law and directs
Fannie’s servicers to take steps (including the payment of delinquent taxes or
association liens) as necessary to prevent the attachment of a lien that would
take priority over Fannie under state
law. Similar language appeared in Fannie’s servicing guidelines during prior
years. See, e.g., Fannie Mae Single Family 2011 Servicing Guide (June 10, 2011),
at 302-2 (“When the HOA of a PUD or
condo project notiies the servicer that
a borrower is 60 days’ delinquent in
the payment of assessments or charges
levied by the association, the servicer
should advance the funds to pay the
charges if necessary to protect the priority of Fannie Mae’s mortgage lien.
If the project is located in a state that
has adopted the Uniform Condominium Act (UCA), the Uniform Common
Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA), or a
similar statute that provides for up to
six months of delinquent regular condominium assessments to have lien
priority over the mortgage lien, Fannie
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Mae will reimburse the servicer for up
to six months of such advances.”); Fannie Mae Single Family 2012 Servicing
Guide (Mar. 14, 2012), at 302-2 (same).
Under FHFA’s proffered interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3), such
directives would be unnecessary. If
property of the FHFA (including a
Fannie mortgage lien) is not subject to lien attachment or foreclosure
without FHFA’s consent, Fannie’s servicers would not need to act to protect
Fannie’s priority. The directives that
mandate Fannie’s servicers to act as
needed to protect Fannie’s lien priority manifest FHFA’s “consent” to the
operation of state law priority rules that
accord a limited priority to association
liens under UCA or UCIOA.
Furthermore, the current Fannie
servicing guidelines make clear that
servicers must inform Fannie of “nonroutine” litigation, including any action
that “challenges the validity, priority, or
enforceability of a Fannie Mae mortgage loan or seeks to impair Fannie
Mae’s interest in an acquired property,”
including “an attempt by another lienholder to assert priority over Fannie
Mae’s lien or extinguish Fannie Mae’s
interests.” Servicing Guide: Fannie Mae
Single Family (Jan. 14, 2015), at 561, 563.
This duty includes the opportunity to
“[p]eriodically update Fannie Mae on
the progress of non-routine litigation
as necessary and appropriate” and to
“[p]rovide Fannie Mae with suficient
opportunity in advance of any deadline or due date to review and comment
upon proposed substantive pleadings.”
Id. at 562. If an association lien foreclosure conducted without FHFA’s express
consent is illegal and void, as FHFA
now claims, these directives would
serve no purpose. These directives likewise manifest FHFA’s implied consent
to state law proceedings in which a
holder of a conlicting lien entitled to
priority under state law seeks to foreclose its lien and extinguish Fannie’s
mortgage lien.
Finally, at no point during the irst
six years of FHFA’s conservatorship
did the FHFA assert (or instruct the
GSEs to assert) 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) as
a basis to prevent association lien foreclosure sales or to challenge the validity
of such sales. By contrast, participation

by the FHFA and the GSEs in litigation
over the validity and priority of mortgage liens vis-à-vis association liens has
demonstrated the FHFA’s general consent to the operation of state law lien
priority and enforcement rules as they
relate to GSE mortgages. For example, in Trademark Properties of Michigan,
L.L.C. v. Federal Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No.
313296, 2014 WL 6461712 (Mich. Ct.
App. Nov. 18, 2014), Fannie Mae purchased a condominium unit in Manor
Homes of Troy at a judicial foreclosure sale of a MERS mortgage in May
2010. After Fannie acquired the unit,
association dues went unpaid for the
ensuing six months, and, in December 2010, the condominium association
iled a notice of lien and subsequently
foreclosed that lien by advertisement.
At the sale in February 2011, Trademark Properties of Michigan, L.L.C.
(Trademark) purchased the unit for
$6,761.45. Fannie Mae did not act to
redeem the unit during the redemption
period, but just before the redemption
period expired, GMAC (the original
lender) recorded an afidavit in the
land records purporting to expunge
the May 2010 foreclosure deed to Fannie Mae. This afidavit asserted the May
2010 foreclosure sale was void based
on Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Saurman, 807 N.W.2d 412 (Mich. Ct. App.
2011), which had held MERS lacked
authority to foreclose in its own name.
Trademark then sued Fannie Mae
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and MERS seeking to quiet title, arguing that the MERS foreclosure sale
was valid and the subsequent association lien foreclosure (and subsequent
non-exercise of statutory redemption)
extinguished Fannie Mae’s ownership
of the unit. Shortly thereafter, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed Saurman
and held MERS did have authority
to foreclose MERS mortgages. Both
Trademark and Fannie Mae moved for
summary judgment, and the trial court
granted summary judgment to Fannie Mae, concluding the May 2010 sale
was invalid based on the law at the
time of the sale. The Michigan Court
of Appeals reversed, holding the May
2010 sale was valid and rejecting Fannie Mae’s alternative arguments that it
had not received notice of the association’s lien foreclosure. At no point did
Fannie Mae raise the argument that
the association’s foreclosure sale was
invalid because the association did not
obtain FHFA’s consent. The active participation in this case by Fannie and its
servicers conirms the view that the
FHFA, in its role as conservator, has
consented to the operation of state law
lien priority and enforcement rules
as they apply to Fannie and Freddie
mortgages.
12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)(3) Does
Not Apply to Private Parties
As discussed above, 12 U.S.C. 4617(j)
(3) is fashioned after the comparable
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FDIC consent provision enacted in 12
U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) as part of FIRREA.
If judicial interpretation of § 1825(b)
(2) provides a meaningful template
for understanding the intended scope
of § 4617(j)(3), § 4617(j)(3) does not
invalidate association lien foreclosures
under UCA and UCIOA. In fact, previous court decisions interpreting the
FDIC consent provision in § 1825(b)(2)
have concluded it precludes only tax
lien foreclosure sales by state and local
taxing authorities, not foreclosure
sales by private parties.
The prevailing interpretation of 12
U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) as directed only to
state and local taxing authorities is
demonstrated by the decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in FDIC v. McFarland, 243 F.3d 876 (5th
Cir. 2001). Rory McFarland obtained
a $2.5 million loan from the Bank of
Commerce, secured by a mineral lease
mortgage and assignment. When the
Bank of Commerce failed, the FDIC
was appointed receiver for its assets,
including the McFarland note. Thereafter, two judgment creditors obtained
judgments against McFarland. When
the FDIC sued to collect the debt owed
by McFarland, the judgment creditors
intervened, seeking to have the proceeds of the mineral leases paid into
court. The district court ordered McFarland to pay the FDIC from the proceeds
in the court registry and recognized the
mortgage as the irst priority lien. The
FDIC reinscribed the 1984 mortgage
and assignment in various Louisiana parishes in July 1995, and in 1997
the FDIC assigned the mortgage and
assignment to the Dennis Joslin Company. In 1998 Joslin sought to foreclose
the property subject to the 1984 mortgage and to obtain distribution of the
proceeds that had accumulated in the
court registry. David L. Jump, one of the
judgment creditors, objected, contending the FDIC’s failure to reinscribe the
1984 mortgage and assignment within
10 years of its execution resulted in a
loss of priority, such that Jump’s judgment lien now had priority. The district
court agreed, holding FDIC’s reinscription in 1995 was untimely and thus
deprived Joslin of irst priority.
Joslin argued that 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)
(2), as enacted in FIRREA, protected the
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FDIC’s failure to reinscribe by
attaching liens and other instruments to satisfy tax judgments.

FDIC from Louisiana’s state-law reinscription requirements. The Fifth Circuit
rejected this view and afirmed the district court, holding that “[a]lthough
failure to reinscribe a mortgage may
result in the application of an ‘involuntary lien’ to FDIC property, FIRREA
does not provide relief.” The court
noted that before FIRREA, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1825 only exempted the FDIC from
taxation while acting in its corporate
capacity and that FIRREA added subsection (b) to extend that exemption to
FDIC in its role as receiver. McFarland,
243 F.3d at 886 (“[w]e are persuaded
that section 1825(b)(2) merely extends
the general exemption of the FDIC from
taxation to the receivership context”)
(citing from the House Report accompanying FIRREA). The court refused
to apply 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) to liens
not attached by state and local taxing
authorities:
As Jump and Bank One are private entities possessing normal
judgment liens, however, their
claims are not barred by section 1825(b)(2). We therefore
ind that FIRREA does not preclude the application of Louisiana
reinscription law to the FDIC’s
property. Nothing in FIRREA
prevents Louisiana law from
recognizing either the FDIC’s
obligation to reinscribe mortgages or the loss of ranking
suffered by the FDIC if it fails
to meet this obligation. FIRREA
only prohibits state and local entities from taking advantage of the

McFarland, 243 F.3d at 886. If (as FHFA
has suggested) interpretive precedent
under 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) is appropriately used to construe 12 U.S.C. § 4617(j)
(3), then the decision in McFarland suggests that § 4617(j)(3) does not apply to
invalidate a lien foreclosure sale by a
private owners’ association in a UCA
or UCIOA state. As a result, an association lien foreclosure in such a state
would extinguish a Fannie or Freddie
mortgage lien—even without FHFA’s
consent to the sale—if the priority portion of the assessment is not satisied
before the sale.
Conclusion
The notion that FHFA and the GSEs
can thumb their noses at time-honored
state law priority rules is deeply offensive. The GSEs themselves have, in the
past, consistently acted as though they
were fully bound by those rules. From
the inception of the uniform Fannie
Mae-Freddie Mac 1-4 family mortgage
and note instruments, for example,
the GSEs have always been careful
to obtain reviews by local counsel to
ensure that the documents conformed
to the varying laws of the individual
states. They have asserted no federally
preemptive right to disregard state law.
Their claim to the power to ignore state
priority law under HERA is unexpected.
It is not justiied by any emergency
because—whatever the exigencies of
the mortgage crisis—the procedure
that allows an otherwise-irst mortgage
lender to protect its lien from destruction by the foreclosure of a prior owners’
association lien is perfectly clear and
simple to employ. Any such destruction
is a consequence of nothing more than
Fannie’s or Freddie’s servicer being
asleep at the switch. There is no reason
the homeowners’ association should
be punished for the servicer’s carelessness; rather, Fannie or Freddie should
seek reimbursement from the servicer
for such losses. The authors hope and
believe the courts will understand this
and will continue to hold the GSEs to
the normal standards of state priority
law. n
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